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Abstract
This study investigates how adoption of residential solar PV systems responds to changes
in the economic value of adoption caused particularly by electricity price fluctuations. We
shed light on the importance of a house(hold) characteristic that has been largely overlooked
in the literature: the distinction between retrofit installations and new-build installations. To
identify the effect of electricity prices on solar PV adoption, we regard the 2011 Fukushima
nuclear accident and subsequent shutdown of nuclear power plants in Japan as a natural
experiment that resulted in large (temporal and regional) exogenous variations in electricity
generation costs. Using Japanese data for 2009–2014, we find a downward bias of 40–50% in
the estimated effect of electricity prices if they are not instrumented with the cost variations.
Our estimation shows that retrofit installations are 2–2.5 times more responsive to changes
in electricity prices than new-build installations. An important policy implication of these
contrasting responses is that financial incentive programs such as feed-in tariffs can be more
cost-effective if they target more at owners of existing homes than at owners of new-build
homes because retrofitting decisions are more likely to be induced by such incentives.
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Buildings account for about 30% of global final energy consumption (International Energy Agency,
2019). Reducing the use of non-renewable energy in buildings is therefore a priority to achieve
a low-carbon economy. Indeed, there are many government programs (e.g., subsidies) that are
designed to stimulate the diffusion of energy-efficient or renewable-energy technologies for build-
ings, such as energy-efficient heating or cooling and rooftop solar PV electricity generation. Un-
derstanding the factors that influence adoption decisions of these technologies is essential for a
faster transition and more effective policy design.
Many previous studies econometrically examine the determinants of energy-efficient or renewable-
energy investments for buildings (e.g., Hassett and Metcalf, 1995; Gillingham, Harding and Rap-
son, 2012; Michelsen and Madlener, 2012; De Groote and Verboven, 2019). Broadly, these deter-
minants relate to the economic costs and benefits of adoption (e.g., installation costs, subsidies,
and electricity prices), demographic, socio-economic, and political heterogeneity across adopting
households and firms (e.g., size, homeownership, and environmental preferences), and building
characteristics (e.g., building age).
In this context, this paper sheds light on the importance of a house(hold) characteristic that has
been largely overlooked in the previous literature: the distinction between retrofit installations
(i.e., installations on existing buildings) and new-build installations (i.e., installations on new
buildings). Although retrofitting existing buildings with energy-efficient or renewable-energy
technologies has a huge potential for carbon emissions reductions at relatively inexpensive costs
(e.g., Bardhan et al., 2014), the previous studies on the adoption behavior of these technolo-
gies rarely account for this distinction. As a notable exception, Michelsen and Madlener (2012)
conduct a survey on the adoption decisions of residential heating systems in Germany, finding
that demographic, socio-economic, building, and location characteristics are more influential for
retrofit installations of residential heating systems than for new-build installations.
This paper considers important factors that are not covered in Michelsen and Madlener (2012):
financial incentives that increase the economic benefits of adoption, such as electricity prices and
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installation subsidies. We find empirical evidence of a phenomenon unattended in the literature:
the two types of adoption react very differently to changes in these incentives.
Specifically, we examine how residential solar PV diffusion in Japan during 2009–2014 responded
to changes in the financial incentives, particularly electricity prices. Note that electricity prices
(i.e., the prices of electricity purchased from the grid) affect solar PV adoption by changing the
monetary value of replacing grid electricity with self-generated solar electricity. A distinctive
feature of the prefecture-level panel data set we use is that the number of residential solar PV
installations is reported separately for existing homes and new-build homes. We estimate a two-
way fixed effects model, where the number of retrofit or new-build installations is explained
by the price of electricity, other regressors such as local government incentives on PV adoption,
and time/location fixed effects. Separately analyzing retrofit and new-build installations in this
framework reveals the difference in the marginal effect of electricity prices or installation subsidies
between the two categories.
Our estimation results show a clear contrast between retrofit and new-build installations. Retrofit
installations are substantially more responsive to changes in electricity prices and subsidies than
new-build installations are. For example, averaged across our preferred specifications, the esti-
mated elasticity of solar PV adoption with respect to electricity prices is 1.94 for existing homes
(highly statistically significant) and 0.84 for new-build homes (insignificant or marginally signif-
icant). In other words, owners of existing homes are much more likely to be marginal adopters
whose decisions are affected by changes in these financial incentives.
Our results provide an important policy implication for the policy design of financial incentives
(e.g., feed-in tariffs (FITs) and installation subsidies) to promote solar PV systems (and, poten-
tially, other technologies). Given the policy goal of speeding up technology diffusion to reduce
carbon emissions, providing larger support to owners of existing homes, who are more likely to
be marginal adopters, than to buyers of new-build homes can be a simple yet underutilized way
of improving the cost-effectiveness of these programs, as is consistent with the theory of tagging
and targeting (e.g., Akerlof, 1978; Allcott, Knittel and Taubinsky, 2015). As an illustrative example
based on the estimation results and the actual statistics from our data, we simulate the impact of
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marginally increasing the FIT rate for selling self-generated solar electricity to the grid. FITs are
parallel to electricity prices in that higher tariffs and prices increase recurring future benefits of
PV adoption. We find that the marginal effect of FIT spending (as measured by additional solar
PV capacity per additional FIT spending) is 17% higher when the FIT rate is increased for retrofit
installations than when it is increased for new-build installations. The disparity suggests that
setting a higher FIT rate for retrofitting than for new-build fitting is a more cost-effective way of
policy targeting.
The estimation results mentioned above reflect another contribution of the paper. That is, we pay
close attention to the effect of electricity prices, which has been understudied in the PV adop-
tion literature, and use an instrumental variable (IV) to overcome the potential endogeneity of
electricity prices. Self-generated solar electricity can replace a sizable portion (typically, 30–40%)
of an adopter’s consumption of grid electricity. This reduction in grid electricity consumption
is greater than what is achieved by other energy-efficient home appliances (e.g., air conditioners
and refrigerators) for which previous studies find positive effects of electricity prices on adoption
(Rapson, 2014; Houde, 2018). Higher prices of grid electricity obviously increase the private mon-
etary benefit of reducing grid electricity consumption, thus affecting solar PV adoption decisions.1
Borenstein (2017) argues that California’s tiered residential electricity prices likely contribute to
a surge in residential PV adoption, pointing out an important role of electricity prices. Although
electricity prices are typically not the focus of the previous literature on the determinants of PV
adoption, there are studies that include electricity prices as an exogenous covariate regressor and
estimate their impact (e.g., Durham, Colby and Longstreth (1988) and Kwan (2012) for cross-
sectional analyses, and Hughes and Podolefsky (2015), Matisoff and Johnson (2017), and Crago
and Chernyakhovskiy (2017) for panel-based analyses). These studies often report positive (and
statistically significant) effects of electricity prices but at other times find insignificant or even
negative effects.
There are two challenges in estimating the effect of electricity prices (or other financial incentives
for that matter) on technology adoption. First, there is often little variation in electricity prices
1Solar PV adoption is unlikely to be affected by electricity prices if adopters can sell all self-generated electricity
to the grid at a FIT rate that is higher than the marginal electricity price they face.
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once location and/or time fixed effects are controlled for, making precise estimation of the effect
difficult (De Groote, Pepermans and Verboven, 2016). Second, while electricity prices are mostly
assumed exogenous in the previous studies on PV adoption, there may be area characteristics
and trends that affect both PV adoption and electricity prices.2 If such factors are not included in
the estimation model, electricity prices become endogenous. This is obviously a serious concern
in cross-sectional settings. Even panel settings with location and time fixed effects are not free
from this possibility if, for example, electricity prices contain a component that funds FITs for
renewable energy and cannot be controlled for by location or time fixed effects. For these reasons,
previous studies often drop electricity prices from their estimation.
We overcome these challenges by exploiting substantial temporal and regional variations in elec-
tricity prices and generation costs caused by the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident. The nuclear
accident caused by an earthquake of magnitude 9.0 and the subsequent tsunami led to shutdown
of all nuclear power plants in Japan, which did not resume power generation before the end of
our sample period (2014) and most of which still remain shut down as of 2019. Nuclear power
has been replaced by more expensive fossil fuels (crude oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and
coal), raising electricity prices by up to 30% within a few years. Importantly, the extent of the
price hike due to this cost-increasing substitution differs substantially across regions, depending
on each region’s pre-earthquake share of nuclear power and pattern of fuel substitution.3
With this observation in mind, we construct a time series of the average fossil fuel costs for each
region based on the import prices of the three substitute fossil fuels (Japan’s domestic production
of these fuels is negligible) and a formula officially used by electricity companies to set a compo-
nent of the electricity price. This cost shifter is used as an instrument for electricity prices, and
its substantial exogenous variation (both over time and across regions) triggered by the natural
disaster allows us to identify the effect of electricity prices on solar PV adoption. We find that
not instrumenting electricity prices, as in the previous studies above, leads to a large downward
bias (about 40–50% across different specifications). This is likely due to unobserved factors, such
2For example, a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), which has been introduced in more than a half of the states
in the US to increase the share of renewable sources, can boost the adoption of solar PV, while prior studies suggest
the possibility that an RPS increases electricity prices (Palmer and Burtraw, 2005; Fischer and Newell, 2008; Tra, 2016).
3Neidell, Uchida and Veronesi (2021) uses this variation in electricity prices to identify the effect of electricity use
in preventing death due to cold weather.
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[Sources: New Energy Foundation; New Energy Promotion Council; Japan Photovoltaic Energy Association]
Figure 1: Residential Solar PV in Japan (1997-2013)
as pro-environmental preferences of residents, that cause regionally varying trends in not only
residential solar PV diffusion but also in other types of energy-efficiency and renewable-energy
investment by residents and firms that affect electricity demand and supply and thus electricity
prices. Our results indicate that we should care about the endogeneity of electricity prices when
analyzing their effect on the diffusion of solar PV and other low-carbon technologies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background on residential so-
lar PV diffusion and the electricity market in Japan. Section 3 describes the empirical framework
and data. Section 4 presents the estimation results, and Section 5 discusses their implications.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Residential Solar PV in Japan
Residential solar PV electricity generation has been expanding in Japan since the 1990s mainly
due to decreasing PV panel costs, public support such as one-time subsidies on installation and
FITs for generated electricity. Figure 1 shows the number and capacity of annual residential solar
PV installations between 1994 and 2014, indicating a gradual increase until the mid-2000s and a
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Figure 2: Self-consumption and Sales of Self-generated Solar Electricity
rapid expansion after 2009.4 The surge after 2009 is mainly due to two national programs which
both started in 2009: a subsidy on residential solar PV installation and a FIT for solar electricity.
The increase after the 2011 earthquake and Fukushima accident may also be attributable to rising
electricity prices, a hypothesis that we aim to examine.
This national subsidy program was in place from January 2009 to March 2014, providing a one-
time subsidy to households after solar PV installation. Our estimation uses the number of appli-
cations for this subsidy. The subsidy rate was U70,000/kW in 2009, covering roughly 10% of the
average solar PV system cost per kW at that time, and gradually decreased over time to become
U20,000/kW for the final year (about 5% of the per-kW cost at that time). Households in all of
the 47 prefectures could apply for this subsidy, with no quota given to each prefecture.
Under the Japanese FIT scheme for residential solar PV, which started in November 2009, the
price of electricity from the grid influences the economic benefit of adoption. The scheme legally
requires electricity companies to purchase solar electricity from households at a fixed rate for 10
years. An important characteristic of the scheme is that residential solar PV owners, defined as
owners of less than 10 kW of solar PV capacity, can sell only surplus electricity. That is, the solar
PV system first supplies electricity for domestic consumption (“Self-consumption” in Figure 2)
and sells only the surplus after domestic consumption to the electricity grid at a fixed FIT rate
4There were about 288,000 residential installations in 2013 only and cumulatively about 1,547,000 installations until
2013, which are estimated to account for 0.15% and 0.82% of total electricity consumption in Japan, respectively.
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(“Sales to the grid” in Figure 2). Therefore, solar PV adoption rewards households in two ways:
first, by reducing the electricity purchase from the grid and, second, by selling surplus electricity
to the grid. A higher electricity price (for the purchase from the grid) therefore provides a larger
incentive for solar PV adoption because households can expect greater electricity-cost savings by
using self-generated electricity.
The FIT rate was set high to stimulate solar PV diffusion, and the scheme was financed by extra
charges on electricity users. The FIT rate was originally U48/kWh for solar PV systems installed
in 2009 and 2010, and it has been reduced gradually (e.g., U37/kWh for solar PV systems installed
in 2014). During our study period (2009–2014), the FIT rate remained higher than the (average
or marginal) electricity price in any region. Mandatory purchase of renewable electricity means
additional costs to electricity companies. These additional costs are financed by a “renewable
energy surcharge” that is added to each user’s electricity bill and has been increased over time
(from U0.01/kWh in 2011 to U0.35/kWh in 2014 Q1).
The FIT scheme is implemented nationwide, and all prefectures follow the same rules. The FIT
rate and the renewable energy surcharge described above are set by the central government (the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, or METI) and common to all prefectures. This is
important for our study because including time fixed effects can control for the effect of changes
in the FIT and the renewable energy surcharge over the years.
2.2 Residential Electricity Market in Japan
2.2.1 Regulated Regional Monopolies
Prior to 2016, Japan’s residential electricity market was highly regulated by the central govern-
ment (METI). The country was divided into 10 regions, each of which was served by a vertically
integrated monopoly in charge of electricity generation, transmission, and distribution. Each
regional monopoly supplied electricity to all households in the region. For the protection of con-
sumers, electricity prices in each regional market could not be raised without METI’s approval.
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Figure 3: Japan’s Electricity Generation by Energy Source
2.2.2 Electricity Price Variation after Fukushima
On March 11, 2011, a massive earthquake of magnitude 9.0 and subsequent tsunami hit the east
coast of Japan. This earthquake and tsunami caused devastating meltdowns at Tokyo Electric
Power Corporation’s Fukushima No.1 Nuclear Power Plant, triggering severe radioactive con-
tamination of the environment. At the time of the accident, the country had 54 nuclear reactors
in total, 37 of which were in operation (IIC, 2014). Safety concerns on nuclear power led all op-
erating reactors to shut down successively by May 2012, and they were not allowed to resume
operation. Although two reactors were permitted to restart in July 2012, their periodic inspec-
tions in September 2013 resulted in another complete nuclear shutdown, which continued until
August 2015 when a reactor resumed operation under stricter regulations. Figure 3 shows the
effect of the shutdown on Japan’s electricity generation mix. The share of nuclear power was
about 30% before the March 2011 earthquake but dropped to 11% in 2011, 2% in 2012, 1% in 2013,
and eventually 0% in 2014.
Nuclear power was mostly replaced by fossil fuels (coal, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and oil).
In Figure 3, fossil fuels’ share increased from 60% in 2010 to 87% in 2013 and 2014, taking over
most of nuclear power’s share in 2010 (29%). Facing the nuclear shutdown, electricity companies
urgently expanded the use of fossil fuels by, primarily, reactivating old, idle fossil-fuel-based
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Figure 4: Marginal Electricity Price per kWh by Region
generators, which were typically small-sized and less efficient, and, additionally, building a small
number of new ones.
The shutdown of nuclear power plants and substitution by fossil fuels resulted in a sharp increase
in electricity prices because fossil fuels were more expensive sources of electricity generation than
nuclear power.5 The average electricity price per kWh increased by 37% within four years of the
earthquake, from U19.8/kWh to U27.3/kWh. During the period of our analysis (2009 Q1 to 2014
Q1), six electricity companies (regions) raised base electricity prices, with all the cases occurring
after 2012. When requesting METI’s permission for price increases, they listed the increased fuel
costs due to fuel substitution as the primary reason, with some companies also referring to higher
safety and security costs for nuclear power plants under the tightened regulations.
Whereas electricity prices soared in all regions of Japan following the Fukushima accident, the
magnitude of the increase varied substantially across regions. Figure 4 shows the average res-
idential electricity price per kWh by region before and after Fukushima. Some regions (e.g.,
5METI (2015) estimates the fuel cost in 2014 to be U1.5/kWh for nuclear power, U5.5/kWh for coal, U10.8/kWh
for LNG, and U21.7/kWh for oil. The order remains the same in terms of the sum of the operation, maintenance, and
fuel costs: U4.8/kWh for nuclear power, U7.2/kWh for coal, U11.4/kWh for LNG, and U24.3-29.4/kWh for oil.
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Hokkaido, Tokyo, and Kansai) suffered significant price hikes starting in the second quarter of
2011 (about 20–30% within three years), while other regions (e.g., Hokuriku, Chugoku, and Oki-
nawa) experienced milder hikes (7–11% within the same period).
Figures 5 and 6 indicate two major factors that affected the magnitude of each region’s electricity
price hike after Fukushima: the share of nuclear power in the region’s electricity generation
before Fukushima and the increase in the share of natural gas or oil (as opposed to coal) after
Fukushima to substitute for nuclear power. Figure 5 shows a substantial regional variation in
the share of nuclear power before Fukushima (in 2010). The share was over 40% in the regions
most dependent on nuclear power (Hokkaido, Kansai, Shikoku, and Kyushu), whereas it was
less than 5% in Chugoku and Okinawa. Figure 6a plots the increase in fossil fuel’s share between
2010 and 2013 against the decrease in nuclear power’s share in the same period, showing that
nuclear power was mostly replaced by fossil fuels (coal, LNG, and oil) in all 10 regions. Figure
6b plots the percentage increase in electricity prices between 2010 Q1 and 2013 Q1 against the
increase in the aggregate share of LNG and oil in the generation mix between 2010 and 2013.
Figure 6b suggests that substitution by LNG and oil is positively correlated with the magnitude
of the electricity price hike.6 Figures 5 and 6 suggest that regional electricity prices, which exhibit
regionally varying post-Fukushima trends (Figure 4), tended to increase substantially if a region
(i.e., a regional monopoly) depended heavily on nuclear power before Fukushima and needed to
significantly increase the use of LNG and oil (rather than coal) after Fukushima to replace nuclear
power.
3 Empirical Framework and Data
We investigate the impact of electricity prices on residential rooftop solar PV adoption by means
of the following two-way fixed effects model:
ln yit = βpi,t−1 + X′itγ + ηt + µi + ε it, (1)
6It is notable that Hokuriku had a relatively high pre-Fukushima share of nuclear power (28%) but did not suffer
a large increase in electricity prices. Nuclear power was mainly replaced by coal in the region.
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Figure 5: Electricity Mix by Region in 2010 and 2014
(a) Increase in Fossil Fuel’s Share vs. Decrease in
Nuclear Power’s Share
(b) Percentage Increase in Electricity Prices vs. In-
crease in LNG and Oil’s Share
Figure 6: Regional Changes in the Energy Mix and Electricity Prices Between 2010 and 2013
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where i stands for prefecture i and t for period (year-quarter) t. This model is estimated separately
for retrofit installations and new-build installations as well as for both types altogether. On the
left-hand side, yit, is the number of applications to the national subsidy program for residential
solar PV installation in prefecture i during period t. For the independent variables, pi,t−1 is the
one-quarter lagged (marginal or average) electricity price, and Xit is a vector of covariates, such as
the installation subsidy from the prefectural government. We also consider different definitions
for the electricity price variable: the logarithmic form and the two-quarter lagged price. Table 1
reports the summary statistics for these variables. The time fixed effect ηt captures various factors
that are common to all prefectures in period t, such as PV system costs and nationwide policies
(e.g., the FIT scheme, the central government’s installation subsidy, and the “renewable energy
surcharge” that is added to each user’s electricity bill to finance the FIT scheme). The prefecture
fixed effect µi controls for prefecture characteristics that are time-invariant over the sample period,
such as weather conditions and demographics. The idiosyncratic error ε it is clustered at the
prefecture level (there are 47 prefectures).7
We also consider a semi-parametric version of Eq. (1) in which the effect of pi,t−1 is estimated
non-parametrically after partialling out the fixed effects and covariates (Baltagi and Li, 2002; Li
and Racine, 2007). It shows that the relationship between ln yit and pi,t−1 is fairly linear, albeit
unstable at the ends of the distribution, thus supporting the specification in Eq. (1).
First, we describe more details of the dependent variable ln yit, (the log of) the number of applica-
tions to the national subsidy program. The data on yit are available from the Japan Photovoltaic
Energy Association, the operating body of the program. Households applied for the subsidy
before installation, and over 96% of the applications were successfully approved and resulted in
actual installations. We use subsidy applications as our dependent variable rather than subsidy
approvals. This is because the time gap between an application and its approval is typically sev-
eral months but varies case by case, and thus applications better capture the timing of household
adoption decisions than approvals.
7As described in Section 2.2, prefectures in a region were served by a regional monopoly and faced a common
electricity price schedule set by the monopoly. For this reason, we also estimate our model with the error term εit
clustered at the region (rather than prefecture) level, and the results are essentially unaffected.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
National subsidy applications (all) 987 1,285 1,157 40 8,313
National subsidy applications (retrofit) 987 843 710 27 4,655
National subsidy applications (new build) 987 443 485 6 4,038
Marginal electricity price (U/kWh) 987 25.20 2.79 21.05 31.90
Average electricity price (U/kWh) 987 24.61 1.83 22.05 29.95
Fossil fuel cost (U1,000/kl of oil equivalent) 987 31.00 7.94 19.59 54.09
Prefectural subsidy dummy (retrofit)a 987 0.52 0.50 0 1
Prefectural subsidy (U1,000/case; retrofit)b 511 103.73 74.69 14 434
Prefectural subsidy dummy (new build)a 987 0.48 0.50 0 1
Prefectural subsidy (U1,000/case; new build)b 478 98.48 71.60 14 377
Cumulative solar PV installations 987 19,352 16,700 966 107,961
Housing starts (owned properties) 987 1,653 1,323 222 7,108
Population over age 15 (1,000 people) 987 2,361 2,326 501 11,798
Average worker age 987 41.83 0.62 40.0 43.5
Average wage (U1,000/month) 987 269.91 28.12 222.2 377.4
a This variable equals 1 if a prefectural subsidy is present and 0 if it is absent.
b Conditional on the presence of a prefectural subsidy.
For the most part, the data directly reflect each household’s independent decision to adopt solar
PV. Less than 1% of applications were from new detached houses that had solar PV panels pre-
installed by the developers in advance of house sales. Even fewer were applications from (new
or existing) non-detached houses for which collective decisions by multiple households might be
necessary. Additionally, rental or leased solar PV systems (such as those provided by SolarCity
in California) were rare in Japan.
Aggregated across prefectures over 2009 Q2–2014 Q1, there were 831,637 applications for retrofit
installations and 436,852 applications for new-build installations. To show the relative magnitude
of these numbers, there were 28.6 million detached homes in Japan in 2013, and housing starts
for detached homes between 2009 and 2013 amount to 2.1 million. In other words, during the
period of our analysis, about 20% of new-build homes installed solar PV, while about 3% of the
stock of existing homes installed solar PV (excluding those that did so when they were new).
Next, we discuss more details of the electricity price pit, including its potential endogeneity in the
above fixed effects framework. We construct the quarterly data on residential electricity prices
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by averaging the monthly data from the Retail Price Survey published by the Statistics Bureau of
Japan. We use the marginal price for households that consume over 300 kWh a month (or 280 kWh
for the Hokkaido region). Because the standard household’s monthly electricity consumption is
assumed to be 441 kWh by METI, almost all households adopting solar PV, which likely reside
in relatively large, detached homes, face this marginal price. We also use the average price for
the standard household to test the robustness of the results. As discussed in Section 2.2, these
electricity prices exhibit substantial variations over time and across prefectures in the wake of the
Fukushima accident.
A concern in estimating Eq. (1) with the simple fixed effects estimator is the potential endogene-
ity of pi,t−1. Because the time and location fixed effects are both included, this problem arises if
the spatial and temporal variations in electricity prices that are captured by neither ηt nor µi are
correlated with unobservable factors that affect residential solar PV adoption and are absorbed by
neither ηt nor µi. For example, some unobserved factors that vary both over time and across pre-
fectures (e.g., pro-environmental preferences of residents) may have regionally varying impacts
on the pace of not only residential solar PV investment but also other types of energy-efficiency
and renewable-energy investment. Diffusion of these technologies likely reduces a region’s de-
pendence on expensive fossil fuels (by reducing electricity consumption on the demand side and
substituting fossil fuels with renewables on the supply side) and thus keeps the electricity price
trend lower than would otherwise be the case.
To deal with the potential endogeneity of electricity prices, we construct an IV based on a formula
that is used by electricity companies to set a component of actual electricity prices. Note that the
IV should be correlated with electricity prices but uncorrelated with unobservable factors that
affect residential solar PV adoption, after controlling for the time and prefecture fixed effects and other
covariates. For region (regional monopoly) i in period (year-month) m, the weighted average fossil
fuel cost fi,m is calculated as follows:









m−3 are respectively the (country-level) import prices of crude oil, LNG,
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Figure 7: Fossil Fuel Cost by Region
and coal that are averaged over the latest three months (i.e., months m− 3, m− 4, and m− 5),8,9
and ai, bi, and ci (which equals 1− ai − bi) are the weights that reflect the respective fuels’ shares
(among the three fuels) in region i’s energy mix prior to 2008. In fact, the fuel-cost-dependent
component of each region’s electricity price for month m is determined by fi,m, except that each
electricity company might occasionally (e.g., once in several years) update the coefficients ai, bi,
and ci to reflect changes in the company’s energy mix. Because pi,t−1 in Eq. (1) is a quarterly
series, pi,t−1 is instrumented by the average of fi,m over the three months in period (year-quarter)
t− 1. By construction, this cost shifter is correlated with the (marginal and average) electricity
price through fuel price fluctuations. In addition, fi,m can be reasonably considered exogenous
(i.e., uncorrelated with unobserved factors that affect residential solar PV adoption and are ab-
sorbed by neither ηt nor µi) because the coefficients ai, bi, and ci are fixed based on the region’s
energy mix prior to our study period and the import prices rom, r
g
m, and rcm are macroeconomic,
country-level statistics that reflect the conditions in the international energy market. Figure 7
plots this cost shifter IV by region over 2008-2014, showing similarities to the trends of regional
8The original price data are from the Trade Statistics of Japan, and rom, r
g
m, and rcm are obtained by making necessary
conversions to account for the different heating values of the three fuels.
9Japan’s domestic production of these fuels is minimum and ignorable.
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electricity prices (Figure 4).
The covariates Xit are included to control for other observable factors that vary both over time
and across prefectures and may affect solar PV adoption. First, on top of the national subsidy
discussed above, local governments often subsidize households for solar PV installation as well.
Referring to prefectural governments’ budget information, we construct two variables on such
subsidies for each i-t combination and each installation type (i.e., retrofit or new build): (1) a
dummy variable for the presence of a prefectural subsidy and (2) the amount of this subsidy
when the average system capacity (kW) for each prefecture in each year is installed.
Following the earlier literature (e.g., Durham, Colby and Longstreth, 1988; Kwan, 2012; Crago
and Chernyakhovskiy, 2017), Xit further includes prefecture-level demographic variables (housing
starts, population, average worker age, and average wage) that are constructed from the database
of the Statistics Bureau of Japan. Including these variables is particularly important in cross-
sectional analyses. In our panel data setting, most of their effects are likely to be absorbed by
the fixed effects (particularly, the prefecture fixed effects) anyway because these variables change
little within each prefecture over the study period.
4 Results
Table 2 presents our baseline results of estimating Eq. (1) with only the lagged electricity price,
prefecture fixed effects, and time (i.e., year-quarter) fixed effects. The electricity price variable
(pi,t−1) is either the marginal or average price, or its natural logarithm, and is lagged by a quarter
to reflect a delay in the response to electricity price changes (we try other lag structures later). In
the even-numbered columns, the electricity price is instrumented with the average fuel cost, as
discussed in Section 3. The results are reported separately for retrofit installations (Panel R) and
new-build installations (Panel N) as well as for both types altogether (Panel A).
Table 2 Panel A shows that the electricity price has a positive and statistically significant effect
on overall residential solar PV diffusion. In columns (1)–(4), the elasticity of solar PV adoption
with respect to the marginal electricity price is about 0.75 without the IV and about 1.4 with the
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Table 2: Baseline Regression Results
Panel A: All Installations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Marginal pricet−1 (U/kWh) 0.030∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.016)
ln(Marginal pricet−1) 0.76∗∗ 1.43∗∗
(0.32) (0.56)
Average pricet−1 (U/kWh) 0.046∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.021)
ln(Average pricet−1) 1.17∗∗ 1.94∗∗
(0.47) (0.77)
Electricity price elasticity 0.74 1.35 0.76 1.43 1.13 1.76 1.17 1.94
Instrument No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Within R2 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
Panel R: Retrofit Installations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Marginal pricet−1 (U/kWh) 0.036∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.022)
ln(Marginal pricet−1) 0.93∗ 1.75∗∗
(0.48) (0.71)
Average pricet−1 (U/kWh) 0.056∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.030)
ln(Average pricet−1) 1.44∗∗ 2.37∗∗
(0.69) (0.97)
Electricity price elasticity 0.89 1.63 0.93 1.75 1.38 2.13 1.44 2.37
Instrument No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Within R2 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77
Panel N: New-Build Installations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Marginal pricet−1 (U/kWh) 0.0055 0.012
(0.0072) (0.010)
ln(Marginal pricet−1) 0.12 0.23
(0.19) (0.48)
Average pricet−1 (U/kWh) 0.0081 0.016
(0.011) (0.014)
ln(Average pricet−1) 0.19 0.32
(0.31) (0.66)
Electricity price elasticity 0.14 0.31 0.12 0.23 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.32
Instrument No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Within R2 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Notes: All specifications include prefecture fixed effects and time (year-quarter) fixed effects and have 987 observations
(47 prefectures for 21 periods). Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses, where the observations are clustered
at the prefecture level. Prices (marginal or average) are one-quarter lagged electricity prices. In IV specifications, the
electricity price is instrumented by a weighted average of fuel prices. The dependent variable is the log of applications to
the national subsidy on residential solar PV installation. Superscripts ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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IV.10 Columns (5)–(8) use the average, rather than marginal, price of electricity for a standard
household,11 giving a similar result that higher electricity prices lead to more installations. The
estimated effect is somewhat larger with the average price (i.e., about 1.15 without the IV and
about 1.85 with the IV) than with the marginal price. In the first stage of each IV specification,
our cost shifter instrument is positively and significantly correlated with the electricity price
variable with a p-value less than 0.001.
Panels R and N analyze retrofit and new-build installations, respectively, and show that the
result in Panel A is essentially driven by retrofitting. For retrofit installations, columns (1)–(8) of
Panel R show that the effect of electricity prices is significantly positive and larger than in the
corresponding columns in Panel A. On the contrary, Panel N shows that the effect on new-build
installations is small and statistically insignificant. Importantly, our result does not mean that
new-build homes are less likely to be equipped with solar PV systems than existing homes are.
In fact, as described in Section 3, we observe a substantially higher rate of solar PV adoption
for new-build homes than for existing homes. Instead, our result suggests that when making
adoption decisions, owners of new-build homes tend to pay little attention to and, thus, are less
responsive to electricity price changes than owners of existing homes.
Comparing the point estimates in Table 2 with and without the IV, we note that not instrumenting
the electricity price biases the estimated effect downward by about 40–50%. As discussed in
Section 3, an explanation for this bias is that, after controlling for the time and location fixed effects (ηt
and µi), some unobserved factors (e.g., pro-environmental preferences of residents) may result in
regionally varying trends in not only residential solar PV investments (our dependent variable)
but also other energy-efficiency and renewable-energy investments. These investments lower a
region’s dependence on expensive fossil fuels (by reducing electricity demand or substituting
fossil fuels with renewables), thereby alleviating the post-Fukushima electricity price hikes. Note
that our instrument is not affected by this process because it is calculated with fixed parameters
(ai, bi, and ci in Eq. (2)) that were determined prior to our sample period (see Section 3).
10The elasticity for column (1) or (2) is evaluated at the average of pi,t−1 (taken over i and t).
11METI assumes that a standard household consumes 441 kWh a month. We acknowledge the possibility that
households adopting solar PV tend to consume more electricity, so the average price they face can be different from
what the standard household faces.
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Table 3 adds other prefecture-level covariates (Xit in Eq. (1)) to the regression. We include the
information on prefecture-level solar PV adoption subsidies and the cumulative number of resi-
dential solar PV installations (one quarter lagged), along with other demographic variables (each
prefecture’s housing starts, population, average age, and average wage) considered in the earlier
literature (e.g., Durham, Colby and Longstreth, 1988; Kwan, 2012; Crago and Chernyakhovskiy,
2017). Whereas the estimated effects of electricity prices in Table 3 are somewhat larger than the
corresponding estimates in Table 2, they show the similar patterns that retrofit installations are
more sensitive to electricity price changes than new-build installations are and that not instru-
menting the electricity price by the cost shifter leads to a downward bias.
Interestingly, the result about prefectural subsidies also gives a similar contrast between existing
and new-build homes. With acknowledging the potential endogeneity of PV adoption subsidies,
which Hughes and Podolefsky (2015) investigated for the case of California, we find prefectural
subsidies have a significantly positive effect on retrofit installations,12 but not on new-build in-
stallations. Increasing the subsidy rate by U10,000 per case (about 10% of the average amount)
leads to about 0.9% more retrofit installations, whereas doing so has no statistically significant
effect on new-build installations.
Lastly, Table 4 checks the robustness of our results to the number of lags in the electricity price
variable. Compared to columns (4) and (6) of Table 3 with one-quarter lagged electricity prices,
Table 4 uses two-quarter lagged prices (columns (1) and (3)) and additionally includes the change
in the respective electricity prices from t− 2 to t− 1 (columns (2) and (4)). The results show very
similar patterns to columns (4) and (6) of Table 3.
5 Discussion
Across the different specifications estimated above, we robustly find that the marginal effect of
electricity prices is 2–2.5 times larger for retrofit installations than for new-build installations.
There is a similar and even stronger contrast with respect to the effect of prefectural subsidies.
12If we use the estimates in column (4) of Table 3 Panel R for an illustration, the overall effect of a prefectural
subsidy of s per case is given by 0.0085× s− 0.0065, which is positive even for the minimum value of s in the sample.
The equivalent pattern holds for the other columns in Panel R.
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Table 3: Regression Results with Prefecture-level Policies and Other Controls
Panel R: Retrofit Installations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Marginal pricet−1 (U/kWh) 0.039∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.023) (0.017) (0.023)
Average pricet−1 (U/kWh) 0.060∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.031)
Prefec. subsidy (U1,000/kWh) 0.00088∗∗ 0.00085∗∗ 0.00087∗∗ 0.00085∗∗
(0.00042) (0.00043) (0.00042) (0.00043)
Prefec. subsidy dummy 0.080∗ 0.075∗ -0.0035 -0.0054 -0.0045 -0.0065
(0.041) (0.042) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061)
ln(Cumulativet−1) 0.17 0.024 0.27 0.12 0.24 0.12
(0.27) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28)
ln(Housing starts) 0.27∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.28∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
ln(Population) -2.38 -4.08 -1.60 -3.24 -1.65 -2.79
(4.61) (4.43) (4.80) (4.62) (4.82) (4.69)
ln(Avg. worker age) 0.46 0.21 0.35 0.12 0.33 0.17
(1.64) (1.59) (1.62) (1.57) (1.63) (1.59)
ln(Avg. income) 0.17 0.36 0.34 0.52 0.34 0.45
(0.81) (0.79) (0.81) (0.81) (0.81) (0.80)
Electricity price elasticity 0.97 1.92 0.95 1.85 1.47 2.37
Instrument No Yes No Yes No Yes
Within R2 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78
Panel N: New-Build Installations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Marginal pricet−1 (U/kWh) 0.019 0.035∗ 0.019 0.035∗∗
(0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.018)
Average pricet−1 (U/kWh) 0.029 0.045∗
(0.020) (0.024)
Prefec. subsidy (U1,000/kWh) 0.000027 -0.000022 0.000023 -0.000013
(0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00026)
Prefec. subsidy dummy -0.019 -0.019 -0.021 -0.017 -0.022 -0.019
(0.020) (0.021) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
ln(Cumulativet−1) -0.13 -0.20 -0.13 -0.20 -0.14 -0.20
(0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
ln(Housing starts) 0.43∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.090) (0.092) (0.090) (0.092) (0.091)
ln(Population) -2.46 -3.17 -2.45 -3.19 -2.45 -2.97
(3.29) (3.28) (3.30) (3.30) (3.33) (3.29)
ln(Avg. worker age) -2.46∗∗ -2.57∗∗ -2.46∗∗ -2.56∗∗ -2.47∗∗ -2.54∗∗
(1.01) (1.01) (1.01) (1.01) (1.02) (1.02)
ln(Avg. income) 0.16 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.16 0.21
(0.47) (0.46) (0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48)
Electricity price elasticity 0.47 0.87 0.47 0.87 0.71 1.10
Instrument No Yes No Yes No Yes
Within R2 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.93
Notes: All specifications include prefecture fixed effects and time (year-quarter) fixed effects and have 987 obser-
vations (47 prefectures for 21 periods). Robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are reported in
parentheses. Prices (marginal or average) are one-quarter lagged electricity prices. In IV specifications, the electric-
ity price is instrumented by a weighted average of fuel prices. The dependent variable is the log of applications to
the national subsidy on residential solar PV installation. Superscripts ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Regression Results with Different Lags
Panel R: Retrofit Installations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Marginal pricet−1 (U/kWh) 0.066∗∗∗
(0.020)
Marginal pricet−2 (U/kWh) 0.063∗∗∗
(0.020)
Marg. pricet−1−Marg. pricet−2 0.048
(0.055)
Average pricet−1 (U/kWh) 0.089∗∗∗
(0.027)
Average pricet−2 (U/kWh) 0.082∗∗∗
(0.027)
Avg. pricet−1−Avg. pricet−2 0.042
(0.053)
Prefec. subsidy (U1,000/case) 0.00096∗∗ 0.00078∗ 0.00093∗∗ 0.00081∗
(0.00044) (0.00042) (0.00043) (0.00042)
Electricity price elasticity 1.57 1.65 2.01 2.18
Other regressors in Table 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrument Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R2 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.78
Panel N: New-Build Installations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Marginal pricet−1 (U/kWh) 0.028
(0.017)
Marginal pricet−2 (U/kWh) 0.026
(0.017)
Marg. pricet−1−Marg. pricet−2 0.043
(0.033)
Average pricet−1 (U/kWh) 0.037
(0.023)
Average pricet−2 (U/kWh) 0.033
(0.023)
Avg. pricet−1−Avg. pricet−2 0.040
(0.032)
Prefec. subsidy (U1,000/case) 0.000042 -0.000061 0.000043 -0.000030
(0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00026)
Electricity price elasticity 0.65 0.70 0.81 0.91
Other regressors in Table 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrument Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R2 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Notes: All specifications include prefecture fixed effects and time (year-quarter) fixed effects
and have 987 observations (47 prefectures for 21 periods). Robust standard errors clustered
at the prefecture level are reported in parentheses. The electricity price is instrumented by a
weighted average of fuel prices. The dependent variable is the log of applications to the na-
tional subsidy on residential solar PV installation. Superscripts ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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These results imply that owners of existing homes are much more likely to be marginal adopters
whose decisions are influenced by these financial incentives than owners of new-build homes
are. To the best of our knowledge, this difference between retrofit and new-build installations has
not been reported in previous studies on the adoption of energy-efficient or renewable-energy
technologies, such as solar PV systems.
It is worth emphasizing that the contrasting responses to financial incentives are observed despite
the fact that new-build homes are much more likely to adopt solar PV than existing homes are.
During the period of our analysis, the adoption rate is about 20% for new-build homes, whereas
it is about 3% for existing homes (excluding those that adopted solar PV when they were new).
This highlights the importance of distinguishing the aggregate behavior of each type and the
behavior of each type’s marginal adopter.
An important policy implication of the contrasting responses is that policies to support residen-
tial solar PV adoption (e.g., FITs and installation subsidies) can be made more cost-effective by
treating retrofit and new-build installations differently. This implication relates to the theory of
tagging and targeting (e.g., Akerlof (1978) and, in the energy efficiency context, Allcott, Knittel
and Taubinsky (2015)). Specifically, our findings imply that providing larger support to retrofit
installations than to new-build installations improves the cost-effectiveness of solar PV subsidies
because retrofit installations are more likely to be the marginal cases that did not take place with-
out these subsidies.13 Essentially, the distinction between existing and new-build homes is an
easily observable characteristic of a house(hold) along which tagging and targeting can be im-
plemented to improve cost-effectiveness. This is parallel to price discrimination whereby a firm
makes the price of a good dependent on observable consumer characteristics such as age in order
to increase profits.
A numerical example based on Japan’s FIT scheme (see Section 2.1 and Figure 2) can give a sense
of the impact of such a policy change. The effect of increasing electricity prices is analogous to that
of increasing FITs in the sense that both provide recurring financial benefits for solar electricity
generation. On average, about 30% of electricity generated by a residential solar PV system in
13The same argument can apply to other energy-saving technologies for buildings to the extent that similar contrasts
exist in the response to financial benefits between retrofit and new-build installations of those technologies.
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Japan is consumed domestically and the rest is sold to the grid. Thus, the financial benefits from a
U1/kWh increase in the average electricity price are roughly equivalent to those from a U0.43(≈
0.3/0.7)/kWh increase in the FIT rate (assuming that both changes last for the same period of
time). Based on the point estimates in Tables 3 and 4, the actual FIT rate (U38/kWh), and the
installation statistics for 2013,14 we calculate the effect of marginally increasing the FIT rate for
(a) retrofit installations or (b) new-build installations, where the marginal effect is measured
by the added capacity per unit of the additional FIT budget. We compare the marginal effects
of FIT payments on solar PV capacity. Back-of-the-envelope calculations show that, averaged
across the three IV specifications in Tables 3 and 4 that use the average electricity price as an
explanatory variable, the marginal effect of FIT spending in case (a) is 17% higher than in case (b).
This difference indicates that offering a higher FIT rate to retrofit installations than to new-build
installations improves the cost-effectiveness of FIT spending, relative to the case of a uniform FIT
rate.
Although it is outside the scope of this paper to make a detailed analysis of the reasons behind the
contrasting responses to financial incentives, we outline some possible explanations below. First,
our findings can result from households’ optimal behavior when existing and new-build homes
are different in terms of building and owner characteristics (e.g., house size, energy efficiency,
installation costs, other monetary or non-monetary costs, wealth, household composition, and so
on). For example, solar PV installation on a new-build property typically costs 10–20% less than
installation on an existing property. In addition, large construction or renovation work such as
solar PV installation is physically and psychologically less complicated and burdensome if it is
performed for unoccupied properties including new-build homes. Furthermore, buyers of new
builds tend to be wealthier than owners or buyers of existing homes. These factors can make
new-build homes more likely to be equipped with solar PV than existing homes are, irrespective
of electricity prices or subsidies, thus making new-build installations less sensitive to these financial
incentives.
Second, the differential responses may be due to market failures and behavioral anomalies. A
14In fiscal year 2013, there are 151,533 retrofit installations with the average capacity of 4.81 kWh and 109,509
new-build installations with the average capacity of 4.17 kWh.
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good example of the former is imperfect information, and that of the latter is diminishing sensi-
tivity, as briefly discussed below.
Imperfect information and diminishing sensitivity both relate to the fact that some households
adopt solar PV at the time of home purchase, whereas other households make their adoption de-
cisions separately from home purchase. In our data set, national subsidy applications come from
either new-build homes or existing homes. As stated before, the adoption rate during the period
of our analysis is about 20% for new-build homes and about 3% for existing homes (excluding
those that adopted solar PV when they were new). In the case of new-build installations, house-
holds make home purchase and solar PV adoption decisions at similar timings, and solar PV
systems are installed as the homes are constructed. On the contrary, a vast majority of retrofitting
residential solar PV installations in Japan are separate from home purchases in the sense that
households install solar PV systems on existing properties that they have been residing in (rather
than on existing properties that they have just purchased).15 In other words, there are relatively
few cases in which households adopt solar PV systems at the time of buying existing properties.
Owner households of existing homes who are not active in the housing market may face the issue
of “imperfect information” with respect to solar PV adoption, although this type of households
account for most of the retrofit adoptions (as detailed in footnote 15). Imperfect information
can hamper households’ and firms’ investments in energy-cost-saving measures, as many studies
show (see Gillingham, Newell and Palmer (2009) and Gillingham and Palmer (2014) for literature
reviews). Households may receive useful information about the value of solar PV adoption during
the process of home purchase (e.g., recommendations by architects or real estate agents). For
buyers of new builds, the information thus obtained may be more crucial in their decisions than
15Solar PV installation on an existing home can take place either at about the same timing as the purchase of the
existing home by a new owner, or at a different timing by an owner who has been residing there for some period
of time. Although our data set does not allow us to distinguish these two types of cases, we are certain that a large
portion of installations on existing homes are of the second category, as evidenced by the following data. Unlike
in North America or Europe, new-build homes account for a dominant share in the Japanese housing market. For
example, according to the statistics on owner-occupied properties, 1.11 million detached/tenement houses were built
between January 2011 and September 2013 (with more than 99% being detached houses), whereas 0.24 million used
detached/tenement houses were purchased during the same period. The total number of applications for the national
subsidy program during the same period is 0.24 million for new-build homes (i.e., the adoption rate of 22%) and 0.51
million for existing homes. Even if 22% of the 0.24 million used detached/tenement houses purchased in this period
had applied for the subsidy (which means the same adoption rate as in the case of new builds), they would have
accounted for only 0.05 million cases out of the 0.51 million applications from existing homes. Thus, a vast majority
of installations on existing homes take place separately from home purchases.
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changes in electricity prices or subsidies, making them relatively unresponsive to these changes.
In comparison, most owners of existing homes likely have fewer chances to learn about solar
PV. Therefore, for these owners of existing homes, electricity prices and subsidies are relatively
salient pieces of information in their decision making, resulting in larger marginal effects of these
price signals for existing homes than for new-build homes.
Alternatively, the property of diminishing sensitivity investigated in prospect theory (e.g., Tver-
sky and Kahneman, 1992) implies that a household tends to be less thoughtful about a solar PV
investment if it is coupled with another large investment. For new-build homes, solar PV adop-
tion is a relatively small, additional investment decision that accompanies a far more important
decision on home purchase. Conversely, this is not the case for most retrofitting decisions that are
made independently from home purchase decisions. Under these circumstances, the property of
diminishing sensitivity implies that buyers of new builds, on average, are less attentive to their
solar PV adoption decisions than owners of existing homes are. New-build installations are thus
less sensitive than retrofit installations to the price signals that are relate to the economic benefits
of solar PV adoption.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the effects of financial incentives, particularly electricity prices, on the adop-
tion behavior of energy-efficient or renewable-energy technologies for buildings, focusing on the
case of rooftop residential solar PV diffusion in Japan for 2009–2014. We overcome two econo-
metric hurdles (i.e., little variation in electricity prices after controlling for location and time fixed
effects and the potential endogeneity of electricity prices) by using the 2011 Fukushima nuclear
accident and subsequent shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan as a natural experiment.
This shutdown increased the use of more expensive fossil fuels and thus led to sizable, exogenous,
and regionally varying hikes in electricity generation costs, which allow us to identify the causal
effect of electricity prices on residential solar PV adoption. Our results indicate the importance of
instrumenting electricity prices, although they are typically assumed exogenous in the literature
on the adoption of energy-efficient or renewable-energy technologies. That is, we find that not
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instrumenting electricity prices with the cost shifter results in a downward bias of about 40–50%
in the estimated effect of electricity prices on PV adoption.
Our estimation results show strong and coherent evidence of a phenomenon previously unat-
tended in the literature. Namely, retrofit installations on existing homes are much more sensitive
to changes in financial incentives, such as electricity prices and subsidies, and thus more likely
to be marginal cases where decisions are switched by such changes, than installations on new-
build homes are. Whether the same tendency holds in the adoption of other energy-cost-saving
measures for buildings is an important question for future research.
These results suggest the importance of targeting in designing subsidy schemes (e.g., FITs and
installation subsidies) for rooftop solar PV systems (or other low-carbon building technologies).
In many of these subsidy schemes, including the one we analyze in this study, retrofit installations
and new-build installations are treated uniformly. Our results suggest that targeting existing
homes more by, for example, setting a higher subsidy rate for them than for new-build homes
can be a simple approach, in terms of policy design and implementation, to improve the cost-
effectiveness of these subsidies. A simulation based on our empirical setting shows that the
marginal effect of FIT spending is 17% higher for retrofit solar PV installations than for new-
build installations.
In our data, it is impossible to distinguish between a retrofit that occurs alongside the purchase
of an existing property and one that occurs independently from home purchase. The former
category represents only a small share in our data because Japan’s second-hand housing market
is relatively thin (see footnote 15). It is, however, likely to account for a much larger fraction of
retrofits in other places, such as North America and Europe, where trading of existing properties
is common. It is an empirical question whether retrofits at the time of home purchase are similar
to new-build installations or, alternatively, retrofits without home purchase (or neither of them)
in terms of the effect of financial incentives on technology adoption. Given that a relatively large
share of retrofits (of solar PV and other measures) likely occur with home purchase in many
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